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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to solve the following problem: given a logic,
how to turn it into a paraconsistent one? In other words, given a logic in
which ex falso quodlibet holds, how to convert it into a logic not satisfy-
ing this principle? We use a framework provided by category theory in
order to define a category of consequence structures. Then, we propose
a functor to transform a logic not able to deal with contradictions into a
paraconsistent one. Moreover, we study the case of paraconsistentization
of propositional classical logic.
1 Introduction
Paraconsistent logics were initially studied by S. Jas´kowski in [12] and N. da
Costa in [8]. Since then, much research has changed the scenario in this field.
Lately, we have many (paraconsistent) logics but also many distinct approaches
to them (for a detailed survey on these inquiries, systems and methodologies, see
[14] and also [9]). Some argued that the definition of a paraconsistent logic is not
clear and sufficiently restrictive, because it is not able to determine univocally
what a paraconsistent logic is (see [2]). Nevertheless, it is standard to accept
these logics as those denying some form of the principle known as ex falso
quodlibet, for which, given a formula schema ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ, anything
follows (see [1]):
ϕ,¬ϕ ⊢ ψ
This principle - also widely known as principle of explosion - has a variety
of formulations (just to consider a few examples):
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ⊢ ψ
⊢ ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ ψ)
⊢ (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ ψ
These forms of ex falso hold in classical logic. But, in most cases, in a
paraconsistent logic, they should fail.
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The problem examined in this paper is: given a logic in which ex falso holds,
how can it be converted into a paraconsistent one? Or, is there a procedure for
paraconsistentizing a logic? Formally, given a logic L1 such that ϕ,¬ϕ ⊢L1 ψ,
we have to find a procedure to turn L1 into a logic L2 such that ϕ,¬ϕ 0L2 ψ.
Further, if L1 has a set of properties C, then, does a paraconsistent version of
it, let’s say, L2, preserve some of these properties?
The problem above combined with the idea of a paraconsistentization has
been addressed by Costa-Leite in [7]. However, the author did not present
a general and unified method for producing paraconsistentization, but rather
he proposes only particular ways of turning classical logic and modal logics
into paraconsistent logics. Previously, Beziau in [2] showed how to get some
paraconsistent logics from modal logics using translations of logics, but this
is not a method to convert any given logic into a paraconsistent one. In the
spirit of the goal of this paper, combinations of paraconsistent with modal logics
convert these into logics capable of tolerating inconsistencies. This approach has
been developed by people working with fibring logics, especially in the paper [4].
Afterwards, Payette in [16] explored a way of generating inconsistent non-trivial
logics from consistent ones using a variation of forcing. Differently, Caminada,
Carnielli and Dunne studied in [5] a semi-stable semantics able to find criteria
for a given formal system to have paraconsistent characteristics.
Our approach uses tools from category theory and general abstract logic
in order to provide a way to paraconsistentize any logic. The aim is to get a
general, unified and abstract perspective by means of a functor from the category
of explosive logics (accepting ex falso) to the category of non-explosive logics
(rejecting ex falso). The idea of using category theory to reason about logic
is very popular recently, but studies connecting paraconsistency and categories
are rare, and we could mention, for instance, the case of [19] and also [13].
In order to give an answer to the problem raised in [7], we start by defining a
category of consequence structures (logics in a very abstract sense) called CON ,
and we examine some remarkable features of it. Then, we define a functor using
the category CON and show some properties preserved by this functor (the
paraconsistentization functor). We proceed by defining paraconsistent conse-
quence structures and presenting some sufficient conditions to convert a given
logic into a paraconsistent one. By the end of this article, a particular paracon-
sistentization is presented. We take the case of classical propositional logic and
show how to paraconsistentize it.
2 The category CON
Alfred Tarski, in [17] and [18], came up with a definition of logical conse-
quence (i.e. consequence operator) which allowed logicians to reason at the
abstract level, characterizing this notion by some conditions which are known
as Tarskian. In this paper, we do not impose any condition on the consequence
operator Cn (e.g., inclusion, idempotency, monotonicity, finiteness and so on).
Tarskian structures are particular cases of consequence structures.1
A consequence structure is a pair (X,Cn) such that X is a set and Cn is an
1Logical structures without axioms or restrictions are proposed in [3].
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operation in ℘(X), the power set of X:
Cn : ℘(X)→ ℘(X).
If A is a subset of X , Cn(A) is the set of Cn-consequences of A in the
structure (X,Cn). The set X is called the domain of the structure and Cn is
its consequence operator.
We say that a subset A ⊆ X is Cn-consistent if Cn(A) 6= X ; otherwise, A
is called Cn-inconsistent.
In what follows, if f : X → X ′ is a function, we use also f : ℘(X)→ ℘(X ′)
to denote the function f extended to the power sets. If A ⊆ X , we have:
f(A) = {f(a) : a ∈ A}.
Let (X,Cn) and (X ′, Cn′) be two consequence structures. A homomorphism
h from (X,Cn) to (X ′, Cn′), denoted by (X,Cn)
h
−→ (X ′, Cn′), is a function
h : X → X ′
such that:
(i) h is 1-1 (an injection);
(ii) h preserves the consequence operator, that is, the following diagram is
commutative:
℘(X ′) ℘(X ′)
℘(X) ℘(X)
........................................................................................
..
Cn′
.....................................................................................................
....
h
.....................................................................................................
....
h
.............................................................................................
..
Cn
Thus, h ◦ Cn = Cn′ ◦ h, that is, h(Cn(A)) = Cn′(h(A)), for all A ⊆ X .
Since h is an injection, we have that homomorphisms preserve consistent
sets.
Lemma 2.1. If (X,Cn)
h
−→ (X ′, Cn′) is a homomorphism and A ⊆ X is
Cn-consistent, then h(A) is Cn′-consistent.
Proof. Suppose that A ⊆ X is Cn-consistent and h(A) is Cn′-inconsistent. So,
Cn′(h(A)) = X ′. Since h is a morphism, h(Cn(A)) = X ′. But h is an injection.
Therefore, Cn(A) = X (contradiction!). 
Compositions of homomorphisms are homomorphisms and the identity func-
tion on X is a homomorphism. Compositions satisfy associativity and identities
satisfy the identity laws. Therefore, we have the category of consequence struc-
tures, denoted by CON , whose CON -objects are consequence structures and
CON -morphisms are homomorphisms.
We analyze some properties of CON .
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Proposition 2.2. CON is neither (finitely) complete nor (finitely) co-complete.
Proof. We prove that CON does not have limits and co-limits for the empty
diagram.
Suppose that CON has terminal object (X,Cn) and card(X) = κ. Consider
(Y,Cn′) such that card(Y ) > κ. Since there is no injection from Y to X , there
is no morphism in CON from (Y,Cn′) to (X,Cn). But this is in contradiction
with the initial supposition. Therefore, CON does not have terminal object.
In SET , the category of sets, ∅ is an initial object. If CON would have initial
object, its domain should be ∅. But, in this case, the consequence operator
would be Id{∅}, that is an injection. On the other hand, a CON -morphism h
from (∅, Id{∅}) to (X,Cn) would be such that h(∅) = ∅.
But, it is easy to see that, in this case, the following diagram
℘(X) ℘(X)
℘(∅) ℘(∅)
.............................................................................................
..
Cn
.....................................................................................................
....
h
.....................................................................................................
....
h
..................................................................................................
..
Id{∅}
commutes only if Cn(∅) = ∅. 
By the way, category CON has no co-products:2 Assume any two conse-
quence structures C = (C,CnC) and D = (D,CnD) as well as their co-product
C+D. There are then injections inl : C→ C+D and inr : D→ C+D providing
for any f : C → X and g : D → X an [f, g] : C + D → X with [f, g] ◦ inl = f
and [f, g] ◦ inr = g. Consider that f, f ′ : C → X and g, g′ : D → X are such
that there are c ∈ C, d ∈ D with f(c) = g(d) and f ′(c) 6= g′(d). We have that
f(c) = g(d) guarantees that ([f, g] ◦ inl)(c) = ([f, g] ◦ inr)(d); and given that
[f, g] must be 1-1, this requires inl(c) = inr(d). But f ′(c) 6= g′(d) ensures that
([f ′, g′] ◦ inl)(c) 6= ([f ′, g′] ◦ inr)(d); and since [f ′, g′] is a function, it follows
that inl(c) 6= inr(d) (contradiction!).
The task to determine whether CON has some other universal constructions
should still be explored in detail, and they are beyond the scope of the present
paper. We intend also to study the case in which CON -morphisms are not
injections but only preserve consistent sets.
3 The functor P
Let us construct an endofunctor P on the category CON that will be called
paraconsistentization functor.3
2We thank to the anonymous referee for the proof reproduced here.
3An initial step towards the construction of this functor has been proposed in [11]. Here we
examine this functor in detail, presenting a full characterization of its structure and showing
properties preserved by it.
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If (X,Cn) is a consequence structure, we define a new operation CnP :
℘(X)→ ℘(X) such that, for all A ⊆ X :
CnP(A) :=
⋃
{Cn(A′) : A′ ⊆ A, Cn-consistent}.
In this way, we have that x ∈ CnP(A) if and only if there exists A′ ⊆ A Cn-
consistent such that x ∈ Cn(A′).
Now, we define the action of P on CON :
• For CON -objects (X,Cn), P(X,Cn) = (X,CnP);
• For CON -morphisms h, P(h) = h.
Proposition 3.1. P is an endofunctor in the category CON .
Proof. Consider the following diagram:
(X,CnP) (X
′, Cn′
P
)
(X,Cn) (X ′, Cn′)
...............................................................................................
..
P(h) = h
..............................................................................................................................
....
P
..............................................................................................................................
....
P
...................................................................................................
..
h
We have to prove that (X,CnP)
P(h)
−→ (X ′, Cn′
P
) is, in fact, a morphism. That
is, we have to verify that for all A ⊆ X , it holds that h(CnP(A)) = Cn′P(h(A)),
i.e., the following diagram commutes:
℘(X ′) ℘(X ′)
℘(X) ℘(X)
.................................................................................................................
..
Cn′
P
..............................................................................................................................
....
h
..............................................................................................................................
....
h
......................................................................................................................
..
CnP
The computation is straightforward, using lemma 2.1:
h(CnP(A)) = h(
⋃
{Cn(A′) : A′ ⊆ A,Cn-consistent})
=
⋃
{h(Cn(A′)) : A′ ⊆ A,Cn-consistent}
=
⋃
{Cn′(h(A′)) : h(A′) ⊆ h(A), Cn′-consistent}
= Cn′
P
(h(A)).
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The verification of functorial properties is immediate. 
Let us examine which properties of the consequence operator Cn are pre-
served by the functor P.
Definition 3.2. Let Cn be a consequence operator on X and A,B ⊆ X.
a) We say that Cn satisfies inclusion iff (if and only if) A ⊆ Cn(A);
b) We say that Cn satisfies idempotency iff Cn(Cn(A)) ⊆ Cn(A);
c) We say that Cn satisfies monotonicity iff A ⊆ B implies Cn(A) ⊆
Cn(B);
d) We say that Cn satisfies finiteness iff we have that:
Cn(A) =
⋃
{Cn(A′) : A′ ⊆ A finite}.
Therefore, x ∈ Cn(A) iff there exists a finite subset A′ of A such that x ∈
Cn(A′).
Proposition 3.3. Let (X,Cn) be a consequence structure and A ⊆ X. Then,
it holds the following results:
a) If A is Cn-consistent, then Cn(A) ⊆ CnP(A);
b) If Cn is monotonic, then if A is Cn-consistent, Cn(A) = CnP(A);
Proof. a) Immediate from the definition of CnP.
b) By part a) we have Cn(A) ⊆ CnP(A). Suppose that x ∈ CnP(A). Then,
x ∈ Cn(A′) for some Cn-consistent subset A′ of A. By monotonicity, Cn(A′) ⊆
Cn(A). So, x ∈ Cn(A). 
Proposition 3.4. The functor P enforces monotonicity. In other words, if
A ⊆ B, then CnP(A) ⊆ CnP(B).
Proof. Suppose A ⊆ B and x ∈ CnP(A). Then, there is some Cn-consistent
subset A′ ⊆ A with x ∈ Cn(A). But that same A′ is a Cn-consistent subset of
B with x ∈ Cn(A). So, x ∈ CnP(B). 
Proposition 3.5. The functor P preserves finiteness, i.e., if Cn satisfies finite-
ness, then CnP also satisfies finiteness.
Proof. Suppose that Cn satisfies finiteness. Let x ∈ CnP(A). By definition of
CnP, there exists A
′ ⊆ A, Cn-consistent, such that x ∈ Cn(A′). So, there is a
finite A∗ ⊆ A′ such that x ∈ Cn(A∗). Since Cn satisfies finiteness, Cn(A∗ ⊆
Cn(A”′), so A∗ is Cn-consistent as well. By proposition 3.3 (a), since A∗ is
Cn-consistent, we have Cn(A∗) ⊆ CnP(A∗), so x ∈ CnP(A∗). Therefore, there
exists A∗ ⊆ A, finite, such that x ∈ CnP(A
∗).
On the other hand, suppose that there is a subset A′ of A, finite, such that
x ∈ CnP(A′). So, by proposition 3.4, CnP(A′) ⊆ CnP(A), and x ∈ CnP(A). 
We say that a consequence structure (X,Cn) is normal (or Tarskian) if and
only if the consequence operator satisfies inclusion, idempotency and mono-
tonicity.
Proposition 3.6. If (X,Cn) is normal and there is u ∈ X such that {u} is
Cn-inconsistent, then in (X,CnP) there is no CnP-inconsistent sets.
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Proof. Consider the hypotheses and suppose, ad absurdum, A ⊆ X such that
CnP(A) = X . So, u ∈ CnP(A). Therefore, there is A′ ⊆ A, Cn-consistent
such that u ∈ Cn(A′). Hence, {u} ⊆ Cn(A′) and we have X = Cn({u}) ⊆
Cn(Cn(A′)) = Cn(A′). (contradiction!) 
Corolary 3.7. In the conditions of the proposition above, we have
P(P(X,Cn)) = P(X,Cn) = (X,CnP)
i.e., the functor acts in an idempotent way.
Proof. By proposition 3.6, every subset A of X is CnP-consistent. Therefore,
by proposition 3.3 (b), CnP(CnP(A)) = CnP(A). 
We will see, in the section 5, that the functor P preserves neither inclusion
nor idempotency.4
4 Paraconsistent consequence structures
We will show that a paraconsistent transformation indeed turns structures that
satisfy ex falso quodlibet into a consequence structure in which this principle
fails. In order to do so, we have to introduce some conventions and definitions.5
From now on, we suppose that the set X is endowed with an operator in-
tended to be a negation operation, denoted by the symbol ¬. Thus, if x ∈ X ,
then ¬x ∈ X and ¬x is called the negation of x.
Definition 4.1. Let (X,Cn) be a consequence structure.
1. We say that (X,Cn) satisfies ex falso quodlibet (or satisfies explosion,
or is explosive) iff for all A ⊆ X, if there is x ∈ X such that x,¬x ∈ Cn(A),
then Cn(A) = X (i.e., A is Cn-inconsistent). Otherwise, (X,Cn) is called
paraconsistent.
2. We say that (X,Cn) satisfies joint consistency iff there exists x ∈ X
such that {x}, {¬x} are both Cn-consistent and {x,¬x} is Cn-inconsistent.
3. We say that (X,Cn) satisfies conjunctive property iff for all x, y ∈ X,
there exists z ∈ X such that Cn({x, y}) = Cn({z}).
Now, we present a sufficient condition for the paraconsistentization functor
P to transform a consequence structure into a paraconsistent one. Therefore,
that functor deserves its name!
Theorem 4.2. If (X,Cn) is normal, explosive, satisfies joint consistency and
also conjunctive property, then (X,CnP) is paraconsistent.
Proof. Since (X,Cn) satisfies joint consistency, there exists a ∈ X such that
{a}, {¬a} are both Cn-consistent. ConsiderA = {a,¬a} and, then, Cn(A) = X .
By inclusion, A ⊆ Cn(A) and by joint consistency, A ⊆ CnP(A). As (X,Cn)
4If we want to enforce inclusion, we could make a slight modification in the definition of P
in order to include A into CnP(A), such that
CnP(A) := A ∪
⋃
{Cn(A′) : A′ ⊆ A, Cn-consistent}.
5Chakraborty and Dutta in [6] explore a way to axiomatize paraconsistent consequence
structures using abstract consequence operators.
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satisfies conjunctive property, there exists c ∈ X,Cn({c}) = Cn(A) = X . We
will show that c /∈ CnP(A), i.e., (X,CnP) is paraconsistent. The set A has
three Cn-consistent subsets, that is: {a}, {¬a} and ∅ (the empty set). (∅ is
Cn-consistent for ∅ ⊆ {a} and, by monotonicity, Cn(∅) ⊆ Cn({a}) 6= X .) We
have to show that c does not belong to the operator Cn applied to these sets. If
c ∈ Cn({a}), then {c} ⊆ Cn({a}). By monotonicity, Cn({c}) ⊆ Cn(Cn({a})).
By idempotency and inclusion, X ⊆ Cn({c}) ⊆ Cn({a}), i.e., Cn({a}) = X
(contradiction!). The same argument shows that c /∈ Cn({¬a}). Finally, if c ∈
Cn(∅), then {c} ⊆ Cn(∅). So, we have, X = Cn({c}) ⊆ Cn(Cn(∅)) = Cn(∅)
(contradiction!); therefore, (X,CnP) is paraconsistent. 
In the next section, we study a particular case of paraconsistentization.
5 Paraconsistentization of propositional classi-
cal logic
Let X be the set of formulas of an usual propositional language with ¬ (nega-
tion), ∨ (disjunction), ∧ (conjunction), → (implication) and propositional let-
ters: p, q, r, ..., p1, q1, r1, ... and so on. Let Cn be the standard consequence
operator of the propositional classical logic.
Let (X,CnP) be the result of the action of P on (X,Cn). We call (X,CnP)
a propositional paraclassical logic. We proceed to study some properties of
(X,CnP).
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For convenience, we use A ⊢ a to denote a ∈ Cn(A). On the contrary, we
use A 0 a. Similarly for A ⊢P a.
Proposition 5.1. Inclusion and idempotency do not hold in (X,CnP). There-
fore, these properties are not preserved by the functor P.
Proof. For inclusion, notice that {p ∧ ¬p} 0P p ∧ ¬p because ∅ is the only
Cn-consistent subset of {p ∧ ¬p} and ∅ 0 p ∧ ¬p.
For idempotency, let A = {p,¬p}. Then, p ∨ q,¬p ∈ CnP(A). Therefore,
q ∈ CnP(CnP(A)), but q /∈ CnP(A). 
It is well known that (X,Cn) satisfies the property of transitivity: if A ⊢ b
for every b ∈ B and B ⊢ a, then A ⊢ a. Moreover, we have a weak form of
transitivity: if A ⊢ b and {b} ⊢ c, then A ⊢ c.
Proposition 5.2. Transitivity does not hold in (X,CnP).
Proof. ConsiderA = {p,¬p}, B = {p∨q,¬p} and a = q. Then, {p,¬p} ⊢P p∨q,
{p,¬p} ⊢P ¬p, {p ∨ q,¬p} ⊢P q, but {p,¬p} 0P q. 
For weak transitivity, we need a preliminary result. In (X,Cn), we say that
a ∈ X is a Cn-contradiction iff {a} ⊢ p ∧ ¬p. Moreover, a is a Cn-theorem iff
∅ ⊢ a.
Lemma 5.3. We have the following properties:
a) If b is a Cn-contradiction, then for every A ⊆ X, A 0P b;
6Details of the following constructions can be found in [10], but not using the framework
provided by the paraconsistentization functor introduced here.
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b) If b is a Cn-theorem and {b} ⊢P c, then c is a Cn-theorem and for every
A ⊆ X, A ⊢P c;
c) If {a} ⊢P b, then b is a Cn-theorem or {a} is Cn-consistent and {a} ⊢ b.
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. 
Proposition 5.4. Weak transitivity holds in (X,CnP). That is, if A ⊢P b and
{b} ⊢P c, then A ⊢P c.
Proof. Since {b} ⊢P c, there are some Cn-consistent K ⊆ {b} with K ⊢ c.
Either K = ∅ or K = {b}; these are the only two subsets of {b}. In the
first case, c is a Cn-theorem, and so A ⊢ c, by the Cn-consistency of ∅ and
monotonicity of CnP. In the second case, {b} ⊢ c. Since A ⊢P b, there are some
Cn-consistent A′ ⊆ A with A′ ⊢ b. By the transitivity of Cn, this gives A′ ⊢ c.
So, there is some Cn-consistent A′ ⊆ A with A′ ⊢ c; that is, A ⊢P c.7 
In (X,Cn), it holds the deduction theorem8: if A∪ {a} ⊢ b, then A ⊢ a→ b.
Proposition 5.5. The deduction theorem is valid in (X,CnP).
Proof. Suppose that A ∪ {a} ⊢P b. Then, there exists B ⊆ A ∪ {a}, Cn-
consistent, such that B ⊢ b. We have two cases:
1) B ⊆ A. In this case, B ∪ {a} ⊢ b and B ⊢ a → b, by deduction theorem for
(X,Cn). Since B is Cn-consistent, we have that A ⊢P a→ b.
2) B * A. In this case, we have B−{a} ⊢ a→ b and B−{a} is Cn-consistent.
So, A ⊢P a→ b.
And this completes the proof. 
Notice that modus ponens does not hold in (X,CnP), for example in the case
that the conclusion of the rule would be a Cn-contradiction. By the same reason,
the converse of deduction theorem does not hold in (X,CnP). For example, we
have A ⊢P (p ∧ ¬p)→ (p ∧ ¬p), but A ∪ {p ∧ ¬p} 0P p ∧ ¬p.
A set A ⊆ X is called Cn-contradictory iff there is a formula a such that
A ⊢ a and A ⊢ ¬a. We say that A is Cn-strongly contradictory iff there
is a Cn-contradictory formula a such that A ⊢ a. Moreover, we say that A
is Cn-paraconsistent iff A is Cn-consistent and Cn-contradictory. The same
definitions hold for CnP.
In (X,Cn), there are no Cn-paraconsistent sets. On the other hand, in
(X,CnP), we have CnP-paraconsistent sets but we do not have neither CnP-
inconsistent sets nor CnP-strongly contradictory sets.
We can summarize the results of this section in the following table.
7We thank one more time one of the referees for suggesting this corrected version of the
proof.
8Notice that we are considering the deduction theorem in one direction only.
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Cn CnP
finiteness X X
monotonicity X X
inclusion X ×
idempotency X ×
transitivity X ×
weak transitivity X X
deduction X X
inconsistent sets X ×
contradictory sets X X
strongly contradictory sets X ×
paraconsistent sets × X
Xmeans that the operator of the consequence structure has the property or
there are sets as indicated.
× means the contrary.
6 Conclusion
Newton da Costa conjectured in many different places that all logics can be
adapted in order to become paraconsistent. The device used in the present
work realizes this task. All theories, regardless of their nature, require an un-
derlying logic. In most cases, this logic is classical and, thus, contradictions are
not allowed. The price to pay for finding a contradiction is sometimes too high
that the theory has to be abandoned or reformulated. Notwithstanding, para-
consistentizing the underlying logic can save a given theory. Basically, meth-
ods of paraconsistentization have applications wherever paraconsistency plays
a role: solving epistemic paradoxes, dealing with deontic dilemmas, modelling
inconsistent reasoning in general, and everywhere we need logics for underlying
contradictory but non-explosive theories, we can apply the methodology de-
veloped here. Therefore, the methodology proposed has a very large range of
application in contexts involving contradictions.
We have developed a way to convert a given logic into a paraconsistent one.
In particular, we focused on doing this by way of functors defined in categories
where consequence structures are objects. This kind of approach can be featured
in universal logic. Instead of exploring particular logical systems, universal logic
investigates all possible logics (see [3]). As pointed out in [7], there is no unique
method for paraconsistentizing a given logic, but rather a plurality of them.
In this sense, paraconsistentization is for paraconsistent logics what universal
logic is for logics in general. Therefore, it is a general theory of paraconsistent
logics. Indeed, there are many methods and ways one can use in order to
paraconsistentize a given non-explosive logic. These other possibilities should
still be studied.
Our approach to paraconsistency does not coincide with other researches
especially because our paraconsistentization is realized without explicit mention
to the concept of negation. It produces an unexpected result: modus ponens is
not generally valid.9 This can be a contribution to discussions regarding the
9Jas´kowski in [12] shows, for example, a case in which modus ponens fails: classical logic
is not able to be an underlying logic of a discussive system.
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nature of paraconsistency and its relation with negation.10 In addition, it offers
another way to deal with inconsistency. Suppose a logician trying to formalize
a given theory and investigating its logical consequences. Then, an explosive
logic - which seems to be adequate for some tasks - is chosen. Nonetheless,
during the investigation, contradictions are found and they cause trivialization
of the system. By applying a paraconsistentization functor, it is possible to
restrict the domain of the original explosive logic to the consistent subsets of
the theory. The advantage os this approach is that it is able to keep main
characteristics of the input logic and, in particular, its theorems. Thus, for
example, an intuitionist logician can still study a constructive theory - and yet
inconsistent - using the paraconsistent counterpart of it, hence keeping crucial
features of the intuitionistic logic but without trivialization.
Last, but not least, the work developed by Rescher and Manor (in [15])
presents logical machinery for obtaining non-trivial consequences from inconsis-
tent sets. Our task is not a generalization of their work. There are essential
differences. Notice that the notion of consistency in our paper is independent
of any underlying language and, in particular, it is independent of the concept
of negation, while their characterization of consistency relies on a previously
established language. In addition, their paper contains a very strong presup-
position: it is not rational to accept all consequences of inconsistent premises
(p.182). This reasoning presupposes exactly one of the core philosophical tenets
that paraconsistent logics try to overcome, namely: the parochial thesis accord-
ing to which consistency is a necessary condition for rationality (for a survey of
the philosophical implications of paraconsistency, see [11]). Once a paraconsis-
tent logic is formulated, the consequences of inconsistent premises are no longer
trivial, so they can all be accepted rationally.
In conclusion, future lines of research could include exploring other universal
properties holding in the category CON , as well as examining more properties
preserved (or lost) when the paraconsistentization functor is applicable. In a
less abstract mode, we can think about consequence structures endowed with
syntactical and semantical dimensions; and, at this level, questions of whether
metalogical properties like soundness and completeness are preserved by para-
consistentization could also be examined.
Acknowledgement
Thanks to anonymous reviewers for a detailed analysis of the paper which helped
us to improve it. Thanks also to Scott Randall Paine for proof-reading the
English.
References
[1] BEZIAU, J-Y. (2000). What is paraconsistent logic? In Frontiers of para-
consistent logic, edited by D. Batens et allia, Baldock, 95-111.
[2] BEZIAU, J-Y. (2002). S5 is a paraconsistent logic and so is first-order
classical logic. Logical Studies, 9(1).
10Negation is required, however, to show that the functor does what it is supposed to do.
But this is a different issue.
11
[3] BEZIAU, J.-Y. (2005). From consequence operator to universal logic: a
survey of general abstract logic. In: Logica Universalis: Towards a general
theory of logics, Birkha¨user.
[4] CALEIRO, C., CARNIELLI, W. A., CONIGLIO, M., SERNADAS, A.,
SERNADAS, C. (2003). Fibring non-truth-functional logics: Completeness
preservation. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 12(2), 183-211.
[5] CAMINADA, M. W., CARNIELLI, W. A., DUNNE, P. E. (2011). Semi-
stable semantics. Journal of Logic and Computation, 22(5), 1207-1254
[6] CHAKRABORTY, M; DUTTA, S. (2008). Axioms of Paraconsistency and
Paraconsistent Consequence Relation. In: Proceedings of Information Pro-
cessing and Management of Uncertainty (IPMU’08), 23-30.
[7] COSTA-LEITE, A. (2007). Interactions of metaphysical and epistemic con-
cepts. PhD Thesis, University of Neuchaˆtel, Switzerland.
[8] DA COSTA, N. (1963). Sistemas formais inconsistentes. (PhD Thesis, in
Portuguese). UFPR, Curitiba, 1963. Editora UFPR, 1993.
[9] DA COSTA, N. C., KRAUSE, D., BUENO, O. (2007). Paraconsistent logics
and paraconsistency. In Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Philosophy
of Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, 791-911. Elsevier.
[10] DE SOUZA, E. G. (1998). Remarks on paraclassical logic. Boletim da So-
ciedade Paranaense de Matema´tica, 18 (1/2), 107-112.
[11] DIAS, D. (2013). Paraconsistent logics from a philosophical viewpoint (in
portuguese). Master’s Thesis: Sa˜o Paulo: PUC-SP.
[12] JAS´KOWSKI, S. (1999). Propositional calculus for contradictory deductive
systems. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 7, 35-56.
[13] MORTENSEN, C. (2013). Inconsistent mathematics, vol. 312, Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers.
[14] PRIEST, G. (2002). Paraconsistent logic. In Handbook of philosophical
logic, vol. 6, 287-393. Springer Netherlands
[15] RESCHER, N., MANOR, R. (1970). On inference from inconsistent pre-
misses. Theory and decision, 1(2), 179-217.
[16] PAYETTE, G. (2009). Preserving logical structure. In: On Preserving: es-
says on preservationism and paraconsistent logic, edited by Peter Schotch,
Bryson Brown and Raymond Jennings, University of Toronto Press.
[17] TARSKI, A. (1930). On some fundamental concepts of metamathematics.
In: Logic, Semantic, Metamathematics. Second Edition. John Corcoran
(ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. 1983.
[18] TARSKI, A. (1930). Fundamental concepts of the methodology of deduc-
tive sciences. In:Logic, Semantic, Metamathematics. Second Edition. John
Corcoran (ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. 1983.
[19] VASYUKOV, V.(2011). Paraconsistency in categories: case of relevance
logic. Studia Logica, 98(3), 429-443.
12
